In an oligopolistic market, only a few firms account for most or all of total production, e.g., automobile, steel, and computer industries. For a dynamic oligopolistic market with two firms competing in quantities, we show that supervisory control theory of discrete event systems provides a novel approach to solve the dynamic oligopoly problem with the aim of maximizing the profits of both firms. Specifically, we show that the controllability, observability, and nonblocking property (which are the core concepts in supervisory control theory) are the necessary and sufficient conditions for two oligopolistic firms in disequilibrium to eventually reach equilibrium states of maximizing the profits of both firms.
I. INTRODUCTION
In an oligopolistic market, only a few firms account for most or all of total production. Oligopoly is a prevalent form of market structure. Examples of oligopolistic industries include automobiles, steel, and computers. In this paper, we study an oligopolistic market with a homogenous good and competition in quantities. One representative model of such oligopolistic markets is the Cournot model consisting of two firms which must decide how much to produce to maximize their profits [4] . In a Cournot equilibrium, each firm is producing an amount that maximizes its profit given what its competitor is producing, so neither would want to change its output. Thus the Cournot equilibrium is an example of Nash equilibrium. When two firms are initially producing output levels that differ from the Cournot equilibrium, is it always possible for the firms to reach the equilibrium eventually?; how do they adjust their outputs until the equilibrium is reached? These dynamic oligopoly problems have been studied by many economists [1, 6, 11] based on the assumption that each firm exactly knows the last strategies of its rival firms and also market demand.
In this paper, we study the dynamic oligopoly problem using supervisory control theory of discrete event systems (DESs) [10] modelled by finite state automata. In [8] , it has been shown that a competitive market can be modelled as a finite state automaton. A dynamic oligopolistic market also has event-driven dynamics, e.g., the state (outputs of firms and a price) of the market changes according to an event (action or decision) of a firm such as increasing output or decreasing it.
In general, such an event occurs irregularly. In this paper, we construct a finite state automaton describing the dynamic behavior of each oligopolistic firm. The model describes how a state (comprised of output and marginal cost) of a firm changes by the events of increasing output, decreasing output, and uncontrollable fluctuations of production cost by exogenous causes. Moreover we model the behavior of a market demand to describe how a state (comprised of total output and price) of the market demand changes by the events of increasing outputs and decreasing outputs of firms, and uncontrollable demand fluctuations by exogenous causes. From these component models, we construct a composite model of the market which describes overall behaviors of firms and market demand. Based on the model, this paper presents the controllability, observability, and nonblocking property to assure that an oligopolistic market in disequilibrium can always reach an equilibrium in the presence of uncontrollable fluctuations of production cost and market demand caused by exogenous factors.
The major differences between our approach and conventional approaches by economists are as follows. (1) Conventional differential or difference equation models do not effectively capture uncontrollable changes in production cost and market demand caused by exogenous factors. They usually deal with fixed situations in which marginal costs and market demands are given as fixed (may be constants or linear curves). However, discrete event models presented in this paper are suitable for modeling such uncontrollable changes of an oligopolistic market. (2) Conventional works usually assume that each firm exactly knows the last strategies of its rival firms and a market demand. However, this paper assumes that each firm does not exactly know its rivals' outputs and marginal costs. Many economists estimate a rival's past output through current information such as price. However, estimation is not always exact, and to exactly know a market demand seems not to be possible in real markets.
II. MODELLING OF AN OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKET 1. Modelling of an oligopolistic firm
In this paper, we consider an oligopolistic market which consists of two oligopolistic firms. Such a market is called a duopoly. The results presented in this paper can be generalized to more than two firms. First, we model the behavior of each oligopolistic firm i ( = 1,2) i as a FSA (finite state automaton)
of which the state transition diagram is shown in Fig. 1 .
× is a set of finite states in which MC is a set of discrete marginal cost values and Q is a set of discrete output values of a good.
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δ is a state transition function defined as : , 
Modelling of a market demand
A dynamic behavior of a market demand in an oligopolistic market can be modeled as the FSA 0 = ( , , , )
of which the state transition diagram is shown in Fig. 2 . C X is a set of finite states defined as = C X P Q × in which P is a set of discrete price values and Q is a set of discrete quantity values of a good.
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Σ is a set of events of which descriptions are shown in Table 2 . C δ is a state transition function defined as : , Fig. 1 . FSA F i of an oligopolistic firm i's behavior. 
increased production of In these states, the total production of two firms is , 
Modelling of an oligopolistic market
In the previous sections, we have modeled individual behaviors of two oligopolistic firms and a market demand. Now it is time to find a composite model for concurrent behaviors of them. It will be a complete model of the market which fully represents the dynamics of the market.
To construct a composite model from individual component models, we employ the parallel composition for automata [3] . Given two FSAs , 0 = ( , , , )
G is defined as follows: 
The notation ! denotes 'is defined'. In the parallel composition, a common event, i.e., an event in 1 2 , Σ ∩ Σ can only occur if the two automata both execute it simultaneously. Thus, the two automata are synchronized on the common events. The private events, that is, those in ( \ ) ( \ ), Σ Σ ∪ Σ Σ are not subject to such a constraint and can occur whenever possible. In this kind of interconnection, a component can execute its private events without the participation of the other component; however, a common event can only happen if both components can execute it. From the FSAs F 1 and F 2 of two oligopolistic firms and the FSA C of the market demand, the overall dynamic behavior of the oligopolistic market is modelled as a FSA
.
can be represented as follows:
( , ) P Q is a state of the market demand FSA C. For a state
c Q x Q and ( ) = P x P be the output of firm , i the market demand, and the price at the state x, respectively. We assume 표 2. 유한상태 오토마톤 C의 사건. Table 2 . The events of the FSA C.
Increase in price. pr de_ Decrease in price.
e., the total output of two firms at a state x equals the market demand at the state. The composite model M of an oligopolistic market represents all possible dynamics of the market which include both profitmaximizing behaviors and non-profit-maximizing behaviors. Also, it includes all adjustment processes that two firms can do in order to reach their profit-maximizing states. From Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 , it follows that That is, a marked state means that both firms maximize their profits at the state. Two firms do not have any incentives to change their outputs at the state since they acquire maximum profits at the state. Thus, a marked state is a Nash equilibrium.
At a state , M x X ∈ the marginal revenue ( ) i MR x of firm i can be computed in practice as follows [9] :
where E i (x) is the price elasticity of demand of firm i which is computed as the percentage change in quantity demanded divided by the percentage change in price. The price elasticity of demand is generally a negative number since the quantity demanded usually falls as the price of a good increases. For two states , ,
Then, the price elasticity at the state x of firm i can be defined as follows:
III. SUPERVISORY CONTROL OF AN OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKET To develop the supervisory control framework for an oligopolistic market, first we categorize the event set M Σ of the
i is a set of controllable events that are enabled or disabled by firm i, and u c i Σ is a set of uncontrollable events that cannot be disabled by firm i. Since two oligopolistic firms in this paper compete in quantities, firm i can control only the increase ( _ _ ) in out i and decrease ( _ _ ) de out i of its output. Firm i cannot prevent other events from occurring in the market. For example, firm 1 cannot prevent firm 2 from increasing its output ( _ _2), in out and it cannot prevent the market price from being down ( _ ).
de pr In addition, since we assume that the increase ( _ _ ) in pc i and decrease ( _ _ ) de pc i in production costs are caused by exogenous factors, these events also cannot be controlled by firm i. For example, the change in the price of some material (an input into making the oligopolistic good) may not be controlled by firms, but it may affect the cost of production.
Thus, we can specify c i Σ and u c i Σ as follows:
To achieve profit maximization, each oligopolistic firm decides whether it will increase or decrease the quantity of output upon the observation of a market's state. In this respect, each firm can be regarded as a supervisor (controller) with the control objective of profit maximization. The control structure for an oligopolistic market can be described as shown in Fig. 3 .
Formally, the control action of an oligopolistic firm i is represented by an oligopoly supervisor S i which is defined as a state-based feedback control map
where 2 M Σ denotes a power set of M Σ and :
MC Q P × × is a projection mapping defined as follows: for a
The projection means that when a market's state is x, firm i only observes ( ),
MC its output Q i , and a market price P at the state. The firm cannot observe its competitor's marginal cost and output. Under the partial observation, the supervisor S i issues a control command ( ( ))
which denotes a set of events to be enabled for next occurrence, i.e., an event
and is disabled otherwise; it σ is always enabled if ,
The controlled market by two oligopoly supervisors is then defined as 
The initial states of M and The aim of supervisory control is that a controlled system follows only desirable behaviors (i.e., control objective). While the uncontrolled market M includes both desirable behaviors and undesirable behaviors, the controlled market 1 2 / S S M ∧ should include only desirable behaviors. The control objective for an oligopolistic market is that the market in a non-marked state (i.e., disequilibrium state) should eventually reach a marked state (i.e., equilibrium state of maximizing the profits of both firms).
To solve this supervisory control problem, we represent the control objective using a FSA. First, we present the notion of sub-automaton of a market M as follows.
Definition 2:
σ is defined, the following condition is satisfied:
From this definition, it is apparent that the controlled market 
/ = S S M M′
∧ by two oligopoly supervisors S 1 and S 2 in which the sub-automaton M ′ is a model to specify the desirable behavior that the market in a disequilibrium state should eventually reach an equilibrium state.
In profit-non-maximizing states, firms generally make decisions in order to reach profit-maximizing states as follows: when marginal cost is larger than marginal revenue, they reduce outputs until the difference disappears, and when marginal revenue is larger than marginal cost, they raise outputs until the difference disappears. Accordingly, a subautomaton M ′ representing the desirable behavior should follow this general decision manner of firms. For this purpose, the following notions are introduced.
Definition 3: A sub-automaton M ′ of an oligopolistic market M is convergent for firm i if (1) for any state
Definition 4: A sub-automaton M ′ of an oligopolistic market M is convergent if it is convergent for both firm 1 and firm 2.
The condition (1) means that when the marginal cost of firm i is larger than the marginal revenue at a state x 1 , the decrease of output ( _ _ )
de out i results in reducing the difference of marginal cost and marginal revenue. Additionally, the event of increasing output ( _ _ ) in out i is not defined at the state x 1 . The meaning of the condition (2) is likewise. A convergent sub-automaton models only firms' individual profit-maximizing behaviors. In other words, firm 1 does not consider how the decision to maximize its profit may affect the profit of firm 2 in a convergent sub-automaton. Hence it is not generally guaranteed that a convergent sub-automaton always includes equilibrium states of maximizing the profits of both firms.
Remark 2: For a convergent sub-automaton
equilibrium states. It implies that even though two firms do the best to maximize their profits, they cannot achieve the goals in the sub-automaton.
The market FSA M is computed from the individual FSAs F 1 , F 2 and C by parallel composition of these automata, i.e., The next question to be addressed in this paper is that when a convergent sub-automaton has equilibrium states, is it assured that two firms in disequilibrium eventually reach equilibrium states in the sub-automaton? In other words, when each firm in a convergent sub-automaton does the best to reach its profit maximization, isn't it possible for the market to reach deadlock or livelock states? A deadlock is a state at which no further event cannot occur, and hence there is no transition path from the state to marked states. Such a deadlock may be reachable when after destructive competition of firms, one firm shuts down or exits the market and the other firm achieves its profit maximization. At the state, the shutdowned firm has nothing to do, and the other firm also has no incentive to change its output since it already achieved profit maximization. A livelock means a set of unmarked states that forms a strongly connected component, but with no transition going out of the set [3] . Such a livelock may be reachable when two firms infinitely repeat the increase and decrease of their outputs to maximize profits, but cannot reach equilibrium states. To deal with these issues, the following notions are not observable. Then, it follows from to reduce the difference between marginal cost and marginal revenue, and through the finite repetitive decreasing of output, the equilibrium of them can be achieved. In this respect, the nonblocking property defined in this paper guarantees that an oligopolistic market eventually reaches marked states.
IV. AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE Let us consider the illustrative oligopolistic market data shown in Table 3 . Using the supervisory control theory presented in this paper, let us explain how this market's behavior can occur.
The marginal revenues in Table 3 are computed by the formula presented in the previous section, i.e., ( 3) = 8 < ( 3) = 36 MC x MR x for firm 2. It implies that firm 2 has an incentive to increase output to maximize its profit. If the two firms are noncooperative, firm 1 has no mean to prevent firm 2 from increasing its output. Thus, firm 2 increases output, and then the market reaches the state x4. The sub-automaton M3 denoted by dotted lines in Fig.  6 models the behaviors of two firms to maximize their profits in a noncooperative manner. It finally evolves into the state x8 at which firm 1 has an incentive to decrease its output since However, it cannot reduce its output at the state since the production below the quantity does not return any profit, i.e., it may lead to the firm 1's shutdown. We can explain it using Theorem 1 as follows. The sub-automaton M3 is convergent, controllable, and observable. However, it is not nonblocking since at the state x8, there is no path of transitions from the state to the market state x2. V. CONCLUSIONS In this paper, we have studied a dynamic oligopolistic market in which two firms compete in quantities in the absence of information about their rivals' outputs and marginal costs. To maximize their profits, each firm adopts the conventional strategy that if marginal cost is larger than marginal revenue, it decreases output, and otherwise it increases output. For this market, we have shown that the controllability, observability, and nonblocking property are the necessary and sufficient conditions for two firms following the conventional strategy in disequilibrium to eventually reach an equilibrium of maximizing the profits of both firms.
